Concerns About Justification for Fetal Genome Sequencing by Francis, Leslie
SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah
Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship Utah Law Scholarship
12-16-2016
Concerns About Justification for Fetal Genome
Sequencing
Leslie Francis
S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, leslie.francis@law.utah.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship
Part of the Applied Ethics Commons, Congenital, Hereditary, and Neonatal Diseases and
Abnormalities Commons, and the Diagnosis Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Utah Law Scholarship at Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey R. Botkin, Leslie P. Francis & Nancy C. Rose, Concerns About Justification for Fetal Genome Sequencing, 17 AM. J. BIOETH.
23–25 (2017).
	
Concerns	About	Justiﬁcation	for	Fetal	Genome	Sequencing			December	16,	2016		Jeffrey	R.	Botkin,	University	of	Utah	Leslie	P.	Francis,	S.J.	Quinney	College	of	Law	Nancy	C.	Rose,	University	of	Utah						The	proposal	by	Chen	and	Wasserman	(2017)	contributes	to	a	long-standing	debate	about	the	scope	of	prenatal	screening	services.	With	realistic	prospects	of	fetal	genome-scale	sequencing	from	noninvasive	maternal	blood	sampling	(NIPW),	their	framework	is	timely.	However,	we	outline	a	number	of	concerns	regarding	this	approach,	ranging	from	the	philosophical	to	the	social	and	clinical.		A	key	concern	in	this	literature	is	that	the	framework	lacks	a	clear	philosophical	foundation.	Despite	the	long	history	of	prenatal	diagnosis	(PND),	a	central	question	remains	regarding	the	core	justification	for	these	services.			
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					_______________________________________________________________________________________________________		Prenatal	screening,	testing,	and	pregnancy	termination	represent	a	complex,	value-laden,	and	expensive	enterprise,	preferably	delivered	by	professionals.	If	society	believes	that	these	services	should	be	routinely	offered	to	pregnant	couples,	as	recommended	by	the	American	College	of	Obstetricians	and	Gynecologists	(Rose	and	Mercer	2016),	then	justification	is	necessary.	Any	proposal	to	dramatically	increase	the	scope	of	these	services	requires	further	explanation	for	why	an	expansion	is	consistent	with	the	core	justification.	There	are	three	traditional	justifications	for	PND	(Bot-	kin	1995).	A	child-centered	justification	argues	that	prenatal	screening	is	intended	to	serve	the	interests	of	the	future	children.	While	the	prenatal	detection	of	certain	conditions	can	benefit	the	child	and	family	through	advance	planning,	this	is	not	the	primary	justification.	The	objective	of	prenatal	genetic	testing	is	to	detect	health	problems	that	could	affect	the	woman,	fetus,	or	newborn	and	provide	the	patient	and	her	care	providers	with	enough	information	to	allow	an	informed	decision	about	pregnancy	management,	including	termination.	So	the	question	is	whether	termination	of	a	fetus	can	be	construed	as	a	benefit	to	the	future	child.	Wrongful	life	lawsuits	implicitly	or	explicitly	sup-	port	this	notion.	But	for	the	most	part,	wrongful	life	suits	have	not	been	successful	in	the	courts,	and	this	line	of	argument	in	the	literature	has	dwindled	because	the	premise	makes	little	sense.	There	are	few,	if	any,	conditions	for	which	we	might	make	a	cogent	argument	that	termination	is	preferable	to	life	with	that	condition.	
	A	social	justification	suggests	that	prenatal	diagnosis	benefits	society	by	reducing	the	number	of	children	born	with	expensive	health	conditions.	There	is	a	history	of	studies	that	claim	to	show	the	economic	value	of	PND,	but	these	studies	are	often	of	poor	quality	due	to	questionable	assumptions	and	the	value-laden	nature	of	the	analyses.	Further,	the	notion	that	society	should	support	PND	for	the	purported	social	benefits	obtained	through	the	prevention	of	undesirable	members	is	plainly	eugenic.	A	justification	of	PND	solely	for	such	social	benefit	is	no	longer	accepted.		The	justification	for	PND	as	a	service	that	promotes	the	interests	of	prospective	parents	remains	viable.	Here	the	argument	is	that	prospective	parents	benefit	from	these	services	by	being	able	to	make	informed	choices	about	the	birth	of	a	child	with	a	condition	that	may	have	important	impacts	on	their	family	or	by	providing	time	to	plan	for	the	birth	of	an	affected	child.	This	line	of	argument	is	strongest	when	the	conditions	targeted	have	significant	implications	for	parents	and	the	family,	such	as	conditions	that	are	lethal	for	the	child	or	severely	debilitating.	This	rationale	has	much	less	force	when	talking	about	screening	for	milder	conditions	or	non-health-related	conditions.	If	Chen	and	Wasserman	support	this	general	line	of	argument,	they	need	a	more	explicit	justification	for	why	parents	have	a	positive	right	to	genome-scale	information	on	the	fetus	and	why	enormous	new	resources	should	be	invested	in	this	enterprise.	Our	second	broad	concern	relates	to	their	assumptions	regarding	the	association	between	genotype	and	phenotype.			Their	arguments	presuppose	that	the	identification	of	a	DNA	variant	in	a	fetus	will	be	directly	related	to	a	health	outcome.	Unlike	molecular	testing	in	the	pediatric	population,	in	which	an	individual	with	clinical	fi	dings	has	molecular	analysis	as	an	attempt	to	identify	or	confirm	a	diagnosis,	prenatal	testing	strategies	with	NIPW	are	much	more	complex.	Routine	prenatal	screening	is	performed	in	the	context	of	evaluating	a	normal-appearing	fetus;	a	fetus	with	obvious	birth	defects	is	currently	referred	for	diagnostic	testing	with	chorionic	villus	sampling	(CVS)	or	amniocentesis	(Rose	et	al.	2016).	It	is	known	that	healthy	individuals	can	harbor	many	deleterious	genes	without	clinical	findings	(Cooper	et	al.	2013).	Therefore,	the	clinical	validity	of	genome-scale	screening	results	in	unselected	populations	is	likely	to	be	very	poor.	Further,	there	are	no	population-based	studies	that	will	capture	data	on	phenotype–	genotype	correlations	in	the	context	of	fetal	genome	sequencing.	In	the	future,	collecting	such	data	would	be	resource	intensive	and	only	likely	to	be	justified	for	conditions	considered	serious	for	the	child	and	family.		Our	third	concern	goes	directly	to	the	core	assumption	about	the	negative	impact	that	“line	drawing”	in	PND	has	for	people	with	the	conditions	that	are	explicitly	targeted.	A	central	rationale	for	the	proposed	framework	is	that	a	full	disclosure	model	avoids	the	identification	of	specific	conditions	in	public	policy	for	which	PND	and	pregnancy	termination	are	considered	justified.	But	there	is	a	set	of	assumptions	here	that	have	not	been	validated.	Does	the	offer	of	PND	for	Condition	A	lead	to	increased	stigma	or	discrimination	against	those	with	Condition	A?	This	question	can	only	be	answered	by	analyzing	broad	social	trends,	which	are	influenced	by	multiple	factors	beyond	any	experimental	control.	With	this	large	caveat,	our	observation	is	that	social	stigma	and	discrimination	have	substantially	decreased	in	recent	decades	for	individuals	with	conditions	like	Down	syndrome	(DS),	spina	bifida,	sickle	cell	disease,	cystic	fibrosis,	and	the	like	that	have	been	the	primary	focus	for	PND.		There	are	several	trends	in	contemporary	medicine	that	illustrate	and	perhaps	influence	
relevant		social		attitudes.	First,	there	has	been	a	remarkable	investment	in	treatments	for	all	of	the	conditions	traditionally	targeted	by	PND.	The	life	span	for	people	with	cystic	fibrosis	has	progressively	improved	and	there	are	established	and	exciting	new	possibilities	for	cure	for	many	people	with	sickle	cell	disease	(Tasan,	Jain,	and	Zhao	2016).	Children	with	Down	syndrome	and	their	families	now	have	a	broad	range	of	interventions	and	supportive	services	that	can	address	associated	medical	conditions,	developmental	challenges,	and	speech	and	language	issues.	Clearly	these	types	of	improvements	in	health	care	would	not	have	occurred	if	society	and	families	with	affected	children	did	not	highly	value	affected	individuals.	This	is	not	to	claim	that	discrimination	against	those	with	disabilities	is	not	an	ongoing	problem,	only	that	the	medical	landscape	is	dominated	by	energetic	treatment	and	support	efforts	despite	advances	in	PND.		A	second	observation	is	that	the	prevalences	of	many	conditions	traditionally	targeted	by	PND	have	not	decreased	dramatically	as	a	result.	In	the	United	States,	the	prevalence	at	birth	of	Down	syndrome	has	increased	in	recent	years	(Mai	et	al.	2013).	This	increase	is	likely	due	to	competing	influences	of	a	trend	toward	older	age	at	birth	for	mothers	versus	the	role	of	PND	in	decreasing	birth	prevalence,	although	neither	of	these	trends	is	dramatic.	de	Graaf	and	colleagues	(de	Graaf,	Buck-	ley,	and	Skotko	2015)	estimate	that	the	proportion	of	DS	fetuses	terminated	is	about	30%	and	this	fi	has	remained	stable	over	the	past	20	years.	Rising	prevalence	and	stable	termination	rates	occur	in	the	face	of	changes	in	PND	approaches	that	involve	offers	of	screening	to	progressively	larger	proportions	of	the	pregnant	population	and	progressively	less	invasive	screening	tools.	These	data	points	suggest	that	developments	in	PND	have	not	led	to	expanding	demand	for	these	services.	To	our	knowledge,	there	is	no	lay	advocacy	movement	calling	for	more	and	better	prenatal	diagnosis.	The	use	of	PND	remains	in	the	realm	of	personal	choice	and,	for	a	variety	of	reasons,	the	majority	of	pregnant	couples	are	not	effectively	using	existing	PND	technologies	to	prevent	the	birth	of	children	with	DS.	We	think	it	unlikely	that	NIPW	will	lead	to	a	significant	new	demand	for	actionable	information	on	traits	with	considerably	less	impact	on	families.		Finally,	public	policy	in	recent	decades	in	the	United	States	has	been	enacted	to	attempt	to	counter	stigma	and	dis-	crimination	against	those	with	disabilities.	The	Rehabilitation	Act,	the	Americans	with	Disabilities	Act	(ADA),	the	ADA	Amendments	Act,	and	the	Individuals	with	Disabilities	Education	Act	all	reflect	commitments	at	the	federal	level	to	inclusion	of	people	with	disabilities.	Many	other	federal	and	state	laws	also	address	disability	discrimination.	Nonetheless,	problems	of	inclusion	clearly	remain.	To	offer	just	two	examples,	people	with	disabilities	continue	to	be	significantly	under	or	unemployed,	and	Medicaid	coverage	for	home-	and	community-based	services	remains	inadequate	in	many	states.	Given	such	circumstances,	it	is	unclear	whether	Chen	and	Wasserman’s	proposal	promises	any	impact	on	discrimination	where	it	plainly	exists.	A	preferable	alternative	in	our	judgment	is	to	continue	to	press	for	the	social	conditions	that	can	support	parents	in	making	informed	choices	in	accord	with	their	values	in	a	limited	set	of	conditions	for	which	there	is	clear	justification.	Chen	and	Wasserman	have	not	yet	made	a	convincing	argument	that	“line	drawing”	in	the	context	of	PND	has	led	or	will	lead	to	stigma	or	discrimination	for	those	with	targeted	conditions,	or	that	sweeping	a	wider	net	with	NIPW	will	impact	the	remaining	problems	of	stigma	and	dis-	crimination	experienced	by	those	with	disabilities.			CONFLICTS	OF	INTEREST	In	2016,	Nancy	C.	Rose	received	an	honorarium	for	writing	the	American	College	of	OB	GYN	
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